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ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
EVIDENCE -CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)
FACTUAL BACKGROUND- Upjohn Co. v. United States
Facts of the Case
The Upjohn Company, a multinational corporation with
world-wide subsidiaries and branches in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, discovered in January, 1976, that one of its foreign sub-
sidiaries made payments to government officials, thus influenc-
ing these parties in business dealings.' After consultation with the
chairman of the board, the company's general counsel' began an
internal investigation.' The counsel elicited information about the
payments from foreign managers and officers using interviews
and questionnaires.' With the questionnaires was a letter of ex-
planation, signed by the chairman, which detailed the aim of the
investigation and urged compliance by the foreign employees.
Replies were to be considered confidential, and were so treated."
The company made two reports to the Securities and Exchange
Commission in relation to the payments.7 These reports, con-
cerning payments of $4.4 million made over a five-year period,
were made available to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by the
company! The IRS immediately began an investigation to deter-
mine Upjohn's tax liability for the five years. Upjohn voluntarily
provided the IRS with schedules and lists of payments concern-
ing approximately $700,000 of the payments, which the company
1. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).
2. General counsel of Upjohn consisted of in-house counsel and outside attorneys, headed
by Gerard Thomas, who held positions as vice-president, secretary, and director of Upjohn and
also served as an officer in several of the subsidiaries of the firm. United States v. Upjohn Co.,
78-1, U.S. Tax Cases (CCH) 9277 (W.D. Mich. 1978) affd in part, rev'd in part, 600 F.2d
1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
3. The purpose of the investigation was to determine the nature of the questionable payments
and to facilitate the formulation of legal advice. Id. at 83,599.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The first report, made on Form 8-K, was a preliminary disclosure made in order
to receive lenient treatment from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC had
previously adopted a policy of leniency for corporations that voluntarily disclosed questionable
activities. The second report was an amendment to the first, updating it upon completion of Up-
john's internal investigation.
8. Id.
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claimed was the extent of its federal income tax liability." Main-
taining that the $3.7 million balance did not affect its federal in-
come tax during the five years, Upjohn refused to allow the IRS
to conduct interviews of an unlimited scope on other issues." The
IRS then issued a summons for the information it sought in con-
nection with the $3.7 million. " Upjohn refused to comply, claim-
ing that this data existed in the form of notes, memoranda, and
other types of material gathered during its internal investigation.
To justify its refusal, Upjohn claimed that this information was
thus protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work pro-
duct doctrine." To enforce the summons, the IRS brought suit
9. Id. at 83,599-600. The materials yielded by Upjohn to the IRS concerned what Upjohn
claimed to be the extent of the effect of the questionable payments on its domestic tax liability.
Upjohn contended that only about $700,000 of the payments affected its prior federal taxes, and
that the remaining $3,700,000 only concerned foreign liabilities.
10. Id. at 83,600.
11. Id. at 83,598. The IRS summons requested "[A]lI files relative to the investigation con-
ducted [by counsel] to identify payments to employees of foreign governments." The summons
also directed that "[t]he records should include but not be limited to written questionnaires sent
to managers of the Upjohn Company's foreign affiliates and memorandums or notes of the inter-
views conducted . . . with officers and employees of the Upjohn Company and its subsidiaries."
Id. The summons was issued under authority of I.R.C. § 7602, which provides:
For the purpose of . . . determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax . the Secretary or his delegate is authorized-
(2) To summon the person liable for tax . . . to appear before the Secretary or
his delegate . . . and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and
to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
12. Id. at 83,598. The work product doctrine, although in existence for years, was articulated
in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The court held that it protected from invasion of
the attorney's privacy the interviews, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions,
notes, and other objects reflecting the work of the attorney. 329 U.S. at 511-12. Inefficiency
would result from the attorney's failure to write down pertinent information because of fear of
disclosure. Id. at 511. An attorney must be free from unnecessary intrusions of his privacy by
opponents. Id. at 510. However, the doctrine is not a privilege, but, rather, is an exception to
the general, liberal use of discovery; it may be overcome. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nor.
General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
The products may be discovered upon a showing of substantial need for the materials and
of undue hardship in obtaining the information without discovery. 329 U.S. at 511. However,
oral statements, in the form of mental impressions or memoranda, are generally beyond any showing
of necessity because it would discourage an attorney from writing out anything that a client or
witness told him, thus stimulating inaccuracy. Id. at 512-13.
Despite the prior rulings not applying the work product doctrine to patent litigation or grand
jury proceedings, modern decisions have extended the doctrine to these areas just as if it were
applied to ordinary controversies. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d
1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1979) (extended work product doctrine to grand jury proceedings); In .re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1979) (extended doctrine to grand juries);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 842 (8th Cir. 1973) (doctrine applied to.
grand juries); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 143 (D. Del. 1977) (doctrine
applied to patent litigation); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 946-47
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (applied doctrine to grand juries); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D.
26, 35 (D. Md. 1974) (extended doctrine to patent matters).
The work product doctrine has been codified in the federal rules governing court proceedings.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
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against Upjohn in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Michigan."
Disposition by the Lower Courts
In United States v. Upjohn Co. , " the trial court decided in
favor of the IRS, holding the attorney-client privilege to be inap-
plicable in the context presented by Upjohn's situation."5 Basing
its decision on the control group test, the court noted that the
weight of authority required supporting the strict scope of the test
and that the rival subject matter test was dangerously broad."6 The
court did not reflect on any cases dealing with other approaches,
save the subject matter test, 7 which was summarily dismissed from
consideration.'" The court found that no control group member
made any of the communications in question and that the attorney-
client privilege did not apply. 9 The reports to the Securities and
Exchange Commission were held by the district court to constitute
a waiver of any possible privilege applying to the materials.2
On appeal,' Upjohn again argued that the information re-
vealed by the investigation was protected by the privilege.
Although the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's determina-
tion that the voluntary reports were a waiver, it adopted the con-
trol group test without more than a mere comparison of the defini-
tions of the conflicting tests." Not discussing other tests in any
detail, the court rationalized its selection of the control group stan-
dard by analogizing the corporate control group to the corpora-
13. The IRS enforced the summons under authority of IRC §§ 7402(b), 7604(a).
Section 7402(b) provides, in pertinent part:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify,
or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States
for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdic-
tion . . . to compel such attendance, testimony, or product.
Section 7604(a) provides, in pertinent part:
If any person is summoned under internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or
to produce [certain data], the United States district court for the district in which
such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to
compel such attendance, testimony, or production of [the relevant data].
14. 78-1 U.S. TAX CASES (CCH) 9277 at 83,597 (W.D. Mich. 1978), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), revd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The trial court stated that "the Harper & Row formula would exclude virtually nothing
from its sweep," and that it ran counter to the principle that the privilege should be construed
as strictly as possible. Id. at 83,602.
19. Id. at 83,597.
20. Id. at 83,603.
21. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
22. 600 F.2d at 1226-27.
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tion itself. In adopting this test, Judge Merritt, speaking for the
court, proclaimed that the narrower rule "recognizes that a cor-
poration's decision-makers, like individual clients, must com-
municate freely and confidentially to counsel."" According to the
court, the control group standard promotes the discussion of
delicate matters with counsel and achieves the objectives of the
privilege.2" The attorney-client privilege, under the court's inter-
pretation, should shield only the communications between the
senior management of the corporation and the corporate attorney.
Further, the court added that a broader test could create a "zone
of silence" by inducing the routing of materials through the at-
torney, regardless of the nature of the information, in order to
conceal from discovering a broad range of information, s thus
resulting in inefficient management."' Having resolved the waiver
issue, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for a determination of
whether any of the employees involved in Upjohn's materials were
members of the firm's control group. 7 Following the Sixth Cir-
cuit's refusal to apply the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine to the data compiled in its internal investigation,
Upjohn petitioned for and was granted certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court."
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
History of the Attorney-Client Privilege
In the Anglo-American body of law, the attorney-client
privilege is the oldest privilege, protecting confidential coin-
munications in the common law as far back as 1577.29 Based on
the policy of encouraging full disclosures by clients to their at-
torneys by shielding the communications between them from
discovery, the attorney-client privilege recognized the apprehen-
sion of clients of divulging information to non-confidential
parties.3 The purposes of the privilege are to encourage the free
and frank communication of facts by clients to attorneys and to
23. Id. at 1227.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1227-28. The court held that the voluntary disclosures made to the SEC waived
the privilege "only with respect to the facts actually disclosed." (citations omitted). Id. at 1227 n. 12.
28. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 445 U.S. 925 (1980).
29. 8 J. WIGMORE, EViDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
30. Id. at § 2291 at 545.
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promote the interests of justice.31 Once a privilege belonging to
attorneys, the attorney-client privilege now is a protection exer-
cised by clients, who may prevent the involuntary disclosure of
information that is cloaked by the privilege.3" The privilege
generally attaches if the communication was made by one seek-
ing legal assistance from an attorney. " Most courts require that
the attorney should be acting in a legal capacity.' Critics, however,
attack the privilege because of its burdensome effects upon
discovery, particularly the cloaking of pertinent facts with a near-
impenetrable shield." Such criticisms have resulted in a strict ap-
plication of the privilege in an attempt to avoid its egregious use
as a shield. 6
Although there are a number of privileges which apply to com-
munications made by one person to another, one treatise has sug-
gested that the attorney-client privilege is paramount io all of
them. 7 The impact of the privilege has been extended by three
31. See Jarvis, Inc. v. A.T. & T., 84 F.R.D., 286, 290 (D. Colo. 1979); In re Ampicillin
Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 383 (D.D.C. 1978); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65
F.R.D. 26, 32 (D. Md. 1974).
32. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29 at § 2290. See also FED. R. EVID. 503(b).
33. See Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., 23 F.R.D. 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). At least one court
would require that the communication be made with the intent of conducting a confidential discus-
sion. See D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr.
468 (1964).
34. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc);
Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425, 427 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Wonneman v. Stratford Sec.
Co., 23 F.R.D. 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
35. 8 J. WIGNO.E, supra note 29, § 2291 at 554. See generally City of Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus and prohibition denied
sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
943 (1963); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n., 207 F. Supp. 771, affd on recon-
sideration, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963).
36. Because many theorists have hypothesized that the privilege burdens the search for truth
while providing intangible results at best, the attorney-client privilege is "strictly confined within
the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principles." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 29, § 2291 at 554.
37. According to Dean Wigmore, there are four criteria governing the establishment of an
effective privilege protecting confidential communications. Unlike other privileges related to
disclosures between two parties, such as the doctor-patient relationship, the attorney-client privilege
meets all four of the requirements. 8 J. WiGMORE, supra note 29, § 2291 at 545.
The four ftindamentals recognized as crucial by Dean Wigrnore to the establishment of privilege
are:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element, of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered.
(4) The inquiry that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation (emphasis by Dean Wigmore).
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29 § 2285 at 527.
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widely-accepted definitions promulgated by jurists and scholars ."
The privilege is often applied by courts which balance the need
of litigants for relevant information with the necessity of pro-
tecting the confidentiality of the client's communications with the
client's counsel.
Once established, the attorney-client privilege is absolute.
However, certain limitations surrounding the strict construction
of the privilege have been developed by numerous courts.
Although some courts have held that there is no presumption in
favor of the privilege, thus placing the burden of proving the ap-
plicability of the privilege upon the asserting claimant, ' ° one court
has referred the question to the trier of fact when the evidence
concerning the privilege was conflicting. 1 Other courts have
limited the protection of the privilege to exchanges made with
38. One of these definitions was promulgated by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). According to the United Shoe decision,
the attorney-client privilege was applicable if four essential requirements were met. First, the
holder of the privilege must have sought to become a client. Second, the party with whom the
holder consulted must be a member of the bar of the court in question and must be acting as a
lawyer in relation to the disclosure. Third, the communication to the lawyer must relate to a fact
revealed by his client, the holder, while not in the presence of third parties. This communication
must have been made for the purpose of obtaining legal services, a legal opinion, or legal assistance,
and not for the purpose of committing a crime or a tort. Finally, the client must claim, and not
waive the privilege. Id at 358-59.
In Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., 23 F.R.D. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), the court declared
that "where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal advisor in his capacity
as such, the communications relevant to that purpose, made in confidence by the client are . . . per-
manently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor except the protection be
waived." Id. at 285.
A third formulation was devised by Dean Wigmore. Consisting of eight points, this theory
establishes the privilege:
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professinal legal ad-
visor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected, (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, except the pro-
tection be waived.
8 J. WIorGMOl, supra note 29, § 2292 at 554. Although each is similar to the others, the three
have been treated as separate. See, e.g., 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 2017 at 133 & n. 91 (West 1970); Comment, The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: Alternatives to the Control Group Test, 12 TEX. TECH. L. R Ev. 459, 459 nn.4 & 6 (1981).
39 See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 522 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc);
In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
40. The privilege must be claimed by the party asserting its protection at the time the materials
are requested or when the documents are placed in an in camera review. Duplan Corp. v. Deer-
ing Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1160-61 (D.S.C. 1975). The court in the United Shoe
decision required the client to claim the privilege to prevent its being waived. United Shoe, 89
F. Supp. at 359. See generally 8 J. WitoORE, supra note 29 at § 2311.
41. D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.2d 723, 729, 388 P.2d 700, 704, 36
Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1964).
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an attorney primarily for legal purposes,' disallowing the privilege
in situations in which the consultations were predominantly
business-oriented."3 If the client made the disclosures in the fur-
therance of a fraud, tort, or crime," or for the sole reason of cloak-
ing general information with confidentiality," the privilege has
been found not to attach.
Although the privilege may not be waived by an attorney,
the client making the disclosure may waive its protection. "6 The
privilege will not apply to communications made in the presence
of third parties or to disclosures whose confidence was broken
by the client. 7 If the client's conduct indicates a waiver, the
privilege is considered to have been waived, notwithstanding the
intent of the client." The privilege cannot act as both a sword
42. See Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 146 (D. Del. 1977); Duplan Corp.,
397 F. Supp. at 1161; Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 33 (D. Md. 1974);
American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Del. 1962); Zenith
Radio Corp., 121 F. Supp. at 794 (D. Del 1954); United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 358.
The privilege may not be recognized if the communication was not made for the purpose
of seeking legal services from an attorney. Duplan Corp., 397 F. Supp. at 1161. The request
for legal services may be inferred, as it is not required to be made explicitly by the potential
client. Hercules Inc., 434 F. Supp. at 144. The communications are, however, presumed to have
been made pursuant to a desire for legal advice. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, at § 2296. Accor-
ding to Dean Wigmore:
[T]he most that can be said by way of generalization is that a matter committed
to a professional legal advisor is prima facie so committed for the sake of the legal
advice which may be more or less desirable for some aspect of the matter, and
is therefore within the privilege unless it clearly appears to be lacking in aspects
requiring legal advice.
Obviously, much depends upon the circumstances of individual transactions.
8 1. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2296 at 567.
43. See Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 147 (D. Del. 1977); Burlington
Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 33 (D. Md. 1974); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules
Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Del. 1962); Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp.
792, 794 (D. Del. 1954).
44. Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp. 434 F. Supp. 136, 155 (D. Del 1977); See also United
Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 358.
45. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383
(1981). See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (John Doe), 599 F.2d 504, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1979); In
re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 385-87 (D.D.C. 1978). See also 81 AM.JuR.
2D WITNESSES § 220 at 253 (1976).
46. According to the United Shoe court, the client had to claim the privilege in order to avoid
forfeiture of the protection by waiver. United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 359.
47. See Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 37 (D. Del. 1977); United Shoe,
89 F. Supp. at 358; D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.2d 723, 735, 388 P.2d
700, 708, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477 (1964).
48. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (D.S.C. 1975). It
has been held that a partial waiver of the privilege, concerning only certain materials involved
in the client's communications with the attorney, constituted a waiver of the privilege as a whole,
inasmuch as the disclosures pertained to the subject matter of the communications. Id. at 1161-62.
A similar situation exists when the advice of counsel is placed into issue in a court proceeding.
As stated by one court, the "deliberate injection of the advice of counsel into a case waives the
attorney-client privilege as to communications and documents relating to the advice." Handgards,
Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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and a shield; courts refuse to allow a client to disclose facts which
would aid his or her position and at the same time to prevent
discovery of the facts which would harm his or her position."9
Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations
The attorney-client privilege was unquestionably applied to
corporations at one time, " but its applicability was restricted by
courts fearing the volume of information that could be con-
cealed by a corporation."1 Because no one individual performs
the information-giving and the decision-making processes of a cor-
poration, it is difficult to determine which of a corporation's
employees may be considered to be acting as the corporation, thus
invoking the privilege on behalf of the company. 2 Prior to 1962,
courts considered corporate clients as equivalent to individual
clients, treating as privileged statements made by corporate
employees to the firm's counsel." The broad construction given
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context comported
with the basic policy on which the privilege was grounded. "
Generally, courts applied the privilege to communications made
confidentially while in pursuit of legal services from an attorney. "
One federal district court devised a "time test" which extended
the privilege to communications made to an attorney, if the sub-
ject matter of the exchanges was primarily legal in nature. 6
Another district court required that each communication be ex-
amined separately to determine if the advice connected with that
49. Duplan Corp., 397 F. Supp. at 1161-62. See Handgards, Inc., 413 F. Supp. at 929.
Dean Wigmore commented that a client "cannot be allowed, after disclosing as such as he pleases,
to withhold the remainder. He may elect to withhold or to disclose, but after a certain point his
election must remain final." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2327.
50. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b) [04] at 503-41 (1980).
It has been noted that "the availability of the privilege to corporations has gone unchallenged
so long and has been so generally accepted that [one] must recognize that it does exist." City
of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus
and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
Several decisions prior to 1962 considered corporate clients to be equivalent to individual
clients. See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del.
1962); Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
51. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, 210 F. Supp. 483; Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Ass'n., 207 F. Supp. 771, affdon reconsideration, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. I11. 1962), revd,
320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
52. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 50, at 503-41 to 503-42.
53. See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co., 211 F. Supp. 85; Zenith Radio Corp., 121 F. Supp.
792; United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. 357.
54. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 50, at 503-44.
55. See supra note 53.
56. United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 360-61.
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disclosure was of a legal nature 7 and if the attorney was acting
in a legal capacity during the consultation. 8 Both of these deci-
sions held that communications of any corporate employee were
privileged, 9 providing that the disclosure met criteria establish-
ed in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.60
Legal scholars and jurists feared that corporate clients would
channel important data through corporate attorneys in order to
invoke the new, boundless attorney-client privilege, thus conceal-
ing relevant information. 6' Heeding admonitions from experts that
the privilege resulted in concrete obstructions to the general duty
to disclose,62 courts began to restrict the application of the privilege
to corporations. The most provocative decision on this subject,
rendered in answer to these fears, was made in 1962 in Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association,63 in which District
Judge Campbell held that the attorney-client privilege did not ap-
ply to corporations." This conclusion was rationalized on grounds
that the personal nature of the privilege barred its application to
non-human corporate entities. 5 Although reversed on appeal,6"
the decision heralded a new generation of cases whose resolution
was based upon variegated restrictions of the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate context. Many of these limitations were
based upon interpretations of dictum in Hickman v. Taylor. ' New
questions arose concerning the applicability of the privilege to
corporations: "Who speaks for the corporations? Are the statements
of all the employees the statements of the client? Are house
counsel . . . lawyers for purposes of the privilege?"68
57. Zenith Radio, 121 F. Supp. at 794.
58. Id, at 794-95.
59. Zenith Radio, 121 F. Supp. at 795; United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 358-59.
60. 89 F. Supp. 357. See also supra note 38.
61. See United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383
(1981).
62. 8 J. WiGMORE, supra note 20, § 2291 at 554.
63. 207 F. Supp. 771, affid on reconsideration, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. 111. 1962), rev'd,
320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
64. 207 F. Supp. at 773.
65. Id. at 773-74.
66. Radiant Burners, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
67. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Many recent decisions have considered a corporation's employees
to be mere witnesses, particularly if the employees acquire relevant information by fortuitous
means. This interpretation of the "witness" has encouraged courts which adhere to the Hickman
dictum to restrict the applicability of the attorney-client privilege. Speaking for the court, Justice
Murphy elaborated that "the protective cloak of privilege does not extend to information which
an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation." 329
U.S. at 508 (emphasis added).
68. American Cyanamid Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 88. The privilege has been applied frequent-
ly to house counsel, and house counselors are generally considered to be attorneys for purposes
of attacking the privilege to communications received by them from their employers. See Burl-
ington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 36 (D. Del. 1977); Georgia-Pac. Plywood Co.
v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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STANDARDS OF DETERMINING APPLICABILITY OF THE
PRIVILEGE TO THE CORPORATE CLIENT
A corporation acts through its agents and employees, who
may be divided into those who give information upon which legal
advice is to be based, and those who act on the advice rendered
by the attorney.69 Courts must designate the employees who act
as representatives of the corporation, thus qualifying the corpora-
tion and the employee as a client.7 Numerous standards have been
proposed in an attempt to discover which employees acquire the
status of client for the corporation." Some of the rules devised
have their origins based on existing standards which were adopted
to deal with the facts on hand."' The diversity in the number of
tests, developed to provide continuity and consistency in deci-
sions, has generally contributed to an uncertainty in applying the
attorney-client privilege.
The Control Group Test
Subsequent to Judge Campbell's sweeping statement in Ra-
69. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 50, at 503-42.
70. Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
71. The majority of the tests have received little or no recognition and support. See Note,
Control Group Test Adopted as Standard for Assertion of Attorney-Client Privilege by Corporate
Client, 58 WASH. U. L. Q. 1041 (1980).
In Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975), the court
held that the subject matter rule was merely a corollary to the control group test. Id. at 1165.
See infra note 76 and accompanying text; see infra note 125 and accompanying text.
According to Duplan the communications not only had to come from members of the control
group in order to be privileged, but the disclosures also had to be incidental to requests for legal
services. Duplan Corp., 397 F. Supp. at 1165. See also Note, supra, at 1047-48.
State courts, apparently not as alarmed by the burden placed on discovery by the attorney-
client privilege, have often maintained the pre-1962 approaches in applying the privilege to cor-
porations. See Stern, Attorney-Client Privilege: Supreme Court Repudiates the Control Group
Test, 67 A. B. A. 1. 1142, 1144 (1981).
In D. I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr.
468 (1964), the California Supreme Court promulgated several basic principles aimed at the pro-
tection of disclosures made by a corporate employee to corporate counsel. Id. at 736, 388 P.2d
at 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 477. Notable among the eleven principles propounded by the court were
those attaching the attorney-client privilege to communications made by "the natural person to
be speaking for the corporation," id., and those communications made by an employee whose
employment was connected to the subject matter of the consultation. Id. These tenets reflect the
general policy followed by the state courts as well as the more recent federal decisions. See Stern,
supra at 1144-45.
72. Many of the standards have resulted from the contention that the complexities of the
modern corporation dictate that a more subjective standard be used. Various authors have pro-
posed standards, and others have offered persuasive arguments in favor of certain existing stan-
dards. Suggestions for approaches which vary from those previously adopted by courts have also
been promulgated. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 38 (a five-point test proposing to achieve
.a proper balance" between the policy of the privilege and the liberal rules of discovery); Note,
Death-Knell for the Control Group Test and a Plea for a Policy-Oriented Standard to Corporate
Discovery, 31 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1043 (1980) (a "records immunity" doctrine merging the attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine and eliminating separate requirements for similar
results) [hereinafter cited as Death-Knell]; Note, Evidence -Privileged Communications- The
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach, 69 MIcH. L. REV.
360 (1970) (privileging communications made by the natural person to speak for a corporation).
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diant Burners, a new standard was developed. City of Philadelphia
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 3 rejected Campbell's theory, but
it also refused to revert back to the broad test of United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. ' Noting an apparent conflict be-
tween the dictum in Hickman and the United Shoe decision," s the
court enunciated its own rule."6 Dubbed the "control group test," 7
this test was refined78 and adopted by a majority of federal courts79
and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.8"
The control group test was designed to privilege the com-
munications of the upper levels of management of a corporation."
It was developed to provide a "bright-line" test by which a judge
could resolve the question of privilege by merely dividing the
documents and communications into those generated by the con-
trol group and those which were not."2 Only the communications
of the control group would be privileged.83 This "bright-line" test
would provide an expedient standard which could be easily ap-
plied and which would result in greater predictability before litiga-
tion in deciding which disclosures by the client would be
privileged." Because the test was objective, it was readily
73. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom. General
Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F. 2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
74. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
75. City of Philadelphia, 210 F. Supp. at 485.
76. Judge Kirkpatrick's rule was expressed as follows:
[If] the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is
in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any
action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he
is an unauthorized member of a body or group which has that authority, then,
in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to
the lawyer and the privilege would apply.
210 F. Supp. at 485.
77. See Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515, 517-18 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
78. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F. 2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968). The court, in clarifying the rule,
stated that "the test is whether the person has the authority to control, or substantially participate
in, a decision regarding action to be taken on the advice of a lawyer, or is an authorized member
of a group that has such power." Id.
79. According to the Third Circuit, "[a] clear majority of the federal courts adhere to the
control-group test." In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1979).
See also Jarvis, Inc. v. AT & T, 84 F.R.D. 286, 291 (D. Colo. 1979); Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975).
80. Proposed Rules of Evidence 5-03 (a)(3), 46 F.R.D. 161, 250 (1969). "A 'representative
of the client' is one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered
pursuant thereto on behalf of the client." Id.
81. City of Philadelphia, 210 F. Supp. at 485. Upper management is difficult to define because
corporate terminology varies among the many corporations. Because terms like "manager", "ex-
ecutive", and "officer" are not clearly defined in corporate business as a whole, the rank of an
employee is precluded as a guide. Id.
82. See Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Client: The Control Group Test, 84
HARV. L. REv. 424, 430 (1970).
83. Id.
84. See Comment, Control Group Test Adopted as Standard for Assertion of Attorney-Client
Privilege by Corporate Client, 58 WASH. U. L. Q. 1041 (1980).
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understood by interested parties.8" The control group test would
also promote sound corporate policy and morality by reducing
the opportunity for the corporate attorney to cloak relevant data
with the privilege.86
Control group proponents purport that too broad a test allows
corporate management to distract discovery by requiring subor-
dinates to channel data on sensitive legal matters and even general
business matters to the hierarchy via the corporation's counsel.7
This "zone of silence" would protect relevant information from
discovery by shielding it with the attorney-client privilege, which
would attach by virtue of the employee's discussion with the at-
torney while following orders."' The control group test would
uphold the policy of liberal discovery of pertinent materials and
would encourage the management to be aware of all sensitive
issues and other matters which had been shifted to the corporate
lawyer under broader standards."
One attractive aspect of the test is its reduction of the burden
of discovery placed on opposing parties.9" Much of the informa-
tion needed by the litigant is not privileged under the test, because
the majority of the relevant facts are within the possession of the
lower levels of employees.91 This test thus achieves justice by mak-
ing all relevant facts available for courts to examine. It also reduces
the litigants' expenses of time and money.
Supporters of the control group test allege that it promotes
the policies justifying the attorney-client privilege."2 By re-
stricting the privilege to the communications of those within the
control group, the client's appreciation of the risks of disclosure
is enhanced." "The incentive to confide is at least partially depen-
dent upon the client's ability to predict that the communication
85. Virginia Elec., 68 F.R.D. 397. The court here stated that "the rule most likely to obtain
the greatest discovery, the rule more easily applied by the court, the rule more easily understood
by lawyers, the rule more likely to be recognized as reasonable . . . and the rule most consonant
with . . . the attorney-client privilege is the control group test." Id. at 400.
86. See Comment, supra note 38, at 463.
87. Id. See also United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd,
449 U.S. 383 (1981).
88. Because of the vast number of agents of a corporation, the overwhelming volume of
communications and documents and the regular use of attorneys, a zone of silence could be created
and could grow as the corporation increases its dealings with its attorneys. Courts would hesitate
to allow facts to be cloaked by the attorney-client privilege merely on the pretext of discussing
activities with attorneys. Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65
YALE L. J. 953, 955-56 (1956).
89. See Comment, supra note 38, at 462-64.
90. See Note, supra note 82, at 429.
91. Id. at 429-30.
92. See 33 VAND. L. REv. 999, 1004 (1980).
93. Id.
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will be held in confidence."" Because the control group is small
in number and has interests similar to those of the corporation,
the members have a compelling incentive to keep the communica-
tion confidential, whereas the vast number of employees on the
payroll would not be so inclined.9"
Despite the glowing accolades granted the control group test,
many criticisms have arisen. The principal criticism is that the
test equates the control group with individual clients." Individual
clients both inform their attorneys of important material and act
on the advice based on that material. The corporate client usual-
ly has the two functions divided among many people. 7 However,
the control group is treated as an individual. Not only does the
upper management give information to the corporation's attorneys,
but it also acts on the advice given.98 The exclusion of lower-level
employees from the privilege denies the attorney valuable infor-
mation pertinent to the formulation of legal advice. The pur-
pose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full disclosure
of relevant facts by clients to attorneys in order to insure the ren-
dition of effective representation by the counsel.o0 All available
sources of information must be examined by the corporate attorney
in preparing for potential or existing litigation.' 1o The control group
test impedes the assimilation of relevant material by detering the
attorney from obtaining information from control members °2
Employees may also hesitate in offering potential evidence to at-
torneys for fear of disclosure by the attorney.' ° The free flow
of data from the client to the attorney, necessary for preparing
the best possible advice, is blocked by the control group test, thus
defeating the purposes of the attorney-client privilege. 1 , As one
court assessed the situation:
The attorney dealing with a complex legal problem "is thus
faced with a 'Hobson's choice'. If he interviews employees
94. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979).
95. See Note, supra 82, at 430.
96. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d at 1236; Diversified Indus., Inc.
v. Meredith, 572 F. 2d 596, 608 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). See also Note, supra note 92, at 1005.
97. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 50, at 503-42.
98. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692.
99. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d at 1236; Diversified In-
dus., 572 F.2d at 608-09. See also Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146,
1164-65 (D.S. C. 1975).
100. See Comment, supra note 38, at 460.
101. See Comment, supra note 84, at 1051.
102. Id. at 1052.
103. See Note, supra note 82, at 431. See also Comment, supra note 84, at 1046 n. 36.
104. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 609.
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not having 'the very highest authority', their communications
to him will not be privileged. If, on the other hand, he in-
terviews only those with 'the very highest authority', he may
find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine
what happened.""'
The control group, rather than aiding the preparation of legal ser-
vies by an attorney, acts as a detriment, and it counteracts the
purposes of the attorney-client privilege. "
Other critics have proposed that the control group test
dissuades corporations from making communications to their at-
torneys in good faith efforts to promote compliance with com-
plex laws or to identify potentially suspect activities.17 Manage-
ment may be hesitant about having employees involved in ques-
tionable dealings discuss the details with attorneys if it is possi-
ble for the opposing party to secure an order forcing production
of these details; the employees themselves may likewise fear such
an occurrence."° Without the protection of the privilege, the con-
trol group may not police the activities of the corporation, resulting
in a lower standard of corporate morality, which could potential-
ly damage the equity of the stockholders from a loss of goodwill
and from large pecuniary penalties. 109
Another complaint is that the control group test is too inflex-
ible to meet the infinite contexts involving the attorney-client
privilege."' Abuses of the privilege avoid detection by the use
of the objective control group test, which examines the identity
of the communicant instead of the nature and content of the com-
munication. A subjective weighing of all pertinent circumstances
would disclose the presence of many of the abuses."'
Perhaps the most interesting complaint is that the control
group test does not actually provide the predictability asserted by
105. Id. (quoting Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege,
12 B. C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 873, 876 (1970)).
106. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 609. But see In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.),
599 F.2d at 1236. The Third Circuit held that applying the privilege to lower employees would
be illusory. The corporate heirarchy could waive the privilege concerning communications made
by subordinates to corporate counsel, thus leaving the lower-level employees unprotected, regardless
of the application of the privilege.
107. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 608-09. But see Jarvis, Inc., 84 F.R.D. at 292.
108. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 609. But see In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.),
599 F.2d at 1237 (even if corporate attorneys cannot obtain privileged facts, the corporation has
no choice but to investigate if it wishes to avoid possible criminal or civil liability); Note, supra
note 82, at 431-32 (the firm certainly would not cease to monitor its employees' activities, freeing
them to create treble damages liability).
109. See Comment, supra note 84, at 1053-54.
110. See Comment, supra note 38, at 464.
111. See supra note 92, at 1005.
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its proponents." 2 Although touted as supplying needed certainty
in determining who speaks for a corporation, the control group
test has been diluted by subjective reasoning in various
jurisdictions."' Courts have reached conflicting conclusions in
defining what constitutes a control group." ' Judge Kirkpatrick,
in City of Philadelphia,"5 stated that corporate rank is not a deter-
minant, and that terms such as manager, executive, and officer
are too ambiguous, and capable of different meanings within dif-
ferent companies." 6 With the many possible situations and com-
munications involved in corporate legal matters, it is not possi-
ble for a court to apply a wholly objective test to decide if the
privilege applies to the corporation." 7 The courts would be
forced to examine each document and disclosure involved in a
case to determine if an employee was a control group member." 8
A non-predictable method of applying the privilege must be used
in order for the attorney-client privilege to have any effect in a
practical sense.
The Harper & Row "Subject Matter" Test
By the end of the 1960's, the control group test had been
adopted by a number of courts" 9 and had been incorporated into
the proposed rules of evidence. 2' During this time, the adequacy
of the control group test was being questioned increasingly. The
Seventh Circuit answered those questions by holding the test to
be inadequate to meet the needs of corporations in the landmark
decision of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker. 2' This was
a consolidated antitrust action in which the plaintiff sought
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1123 (remanded case to lower court for determination of
whether chairman, president, and other upper-echelon officers were control group members);
Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (patent division and research department managers were included
in the control group); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969),
affd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973) (division and corporate heads, but not directors of research,
constitute part of control group); Garrison v. General Motors Corp. 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal.
1963) (directors, officers, and division managers comprise the control group).
115. City of Philadelphia, 210 F. Supp. 483.
116. 210 F. Supp. at 485.
117. Note, supra note 92, at 1005.
118. Note, supra note 82, at 430. Since it is not possible to determine the author of each
document, the court placed the burden on the claimants to prove it. Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117, 119-20 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
119. See supra note 79.
120. See supra note 80.
121. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S.
348 (1971).
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discovery of memoranda prepared by attorneys while interview-
ing corporate employees who had testified before a federal grand
jury. In granting mandamus, compelling the lower court to deny
production, the court rejected the control group test and adopted
a more practical approach.12 The Harper & Row test, also known
as the "subject matter" or "scope of employment" test,'23 articulated
two prerequisites for identifying an employee with the corpora-
tion in order for the privilege to attach to the communications
of the employee.'2 1 If the subject matter of the disclosure is the
performance by the employee of his duties, and if the communica-
tion was made at the direction of corporate supervisors, the
privilege would apply.2 This test emphasizes the nature of the
communications rather than the identity of the communicant. 126
After being affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, "' the
ruling was adopted by a small number of courts. 1 8
Proponents of the subject matter test suggest that it is a better-
reasoned approach to the problem.2 9 By entertaining a more sub-
jective standard, courts may avoid abuses which befall the ap-
plication of the objective test. 3 ' Corporate counsel are able to ob-
tain a freer flow of information from clients whose employees
may consult more openly with the attorney, thus enhancing the
preparation of legal advice by the attorney.' Internal investiga-
122. 423 F.2d at 491-92.
123. Most courts refer to the Harper & Row rule as the "subject matter" test. See Jarvis,
Inc. v. A.T. & T., 84 F.R.D. 286, 291 (D. Colo. 1979); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken,
Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1165 (D.S.C. 1975). However, the term "scope of employment rule"
was employed by the Second Circuit. In re Grand Jury Subpoena v. United States, 599 F.2d 504,
509 (2d Cir. 1979).
124. 423 F.2d at 487.
125. The court in Harper & Row considered that an employee, while not a control group
member, may be covered by the attorney-client privilege:
[An employee of a corporation . . . is sufficiently identified with the corpora-
tion so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where
the employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the
corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought
by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by
the employee of the duties of his employment.
Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491.
126. See Comment, supra note 38, at 465.
127. Decker v. Harper & Row, Inc., 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
128. See, e.g., Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454 (N.D.
Ill. 1974); Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Cf Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164-65 (D.S.C. 1975) (adopted Harper & Row rule
as corollary to control group test). But see In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377,
385-87 (D.D.C. 1978) (rejected both the subject matter test and the control group test).
129. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc);
Jarvis, Inc. v. A.T. & T., 84 F.R.D. 286, 291 (D. Colo. 1979). See also 15 TULSA L. J. 390,
396 (1979).
130. See supra note 92, at 1005.
131. See Note, Attorney-Client Privilege, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 191, 194 (1978).
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tions, whether to detect wrongdoing or to insure compliance with
complex laws and regulations, are not as inhibited under the sub-
ject matter test as under the control group approach." 2 The test
is easily applied because any employee can potentially be privi-
leged upon meeting the two criteria.133
Opponents are scornful of the subject matter test for several
valid reasons. The greatest amount of criticism concerns its poten-
tial for abuse and for impeding discovery."' It tends to create the
zone of silence feared by those who opposed the unlimited ap-
proach of earlier decisions."' Relevant information necessary to
an individual litigant is virtually beyond discovery if the corpora-
tion is allowed to protect all its communications to its counsel."6
This is contrary to the modern policy of liberal discovery espoused
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 7 By using the corporate
attorney as an "exclusive repository of unpleasant facts," corporate
management could remain ignorant of important but sensitive mat-
ters, leaving the only record of full details in the hands of the
corporate attorney." 8 The control group proponents consider that
test as preventing the possible establishment of a zone of silence,
and hold the subject matter test as encouraging such zones. 3 9
Adversaries of the Harper & Row standard consider the broad
privilege to be ineffectual in protecting discovery and in promoting
greater disclosures. Confidentiality, required for the attorney-client
privilege to exist, is doubtful because of the number of parties
which a communication will pass through within a corporation." '
At least one decision doubted that a broader privilege could assist
the search for relevant evidence, stating that the privilege would
be illusory." '4 That court opined that the subordinates would be
confiding in corporate counsel at the risk of having the control
group decision-maker waive the privilege.' 2
132. See 44 Mo. L. REV. 350, 357 (1979).
133. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 609.
134. See Comment, supra note 84, at 1054.
135. Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1227.
136. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 608-09. See also Note, supra note 131, at 194; Note,
supra note 129, at 396.
137. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1),(3).
138. Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1227.
139. See supra note 92, at 1004.
140. Id. at 1007.
141. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
142. Id. at 1236. The court hypothesized a situation in which corporate employees had engaged
in wrongdoing. The control group could waive the privilege as to their discussions with the cor-
porate counsel and turn them in to the authorities. If they had done no wrong, they would have
no fear of giving unprivileged information to counsel. Therefore, the court concluded that the
application of the privilege to lower-level employees was illusory. Id. See also Jarvis, Inc., 84
F.R.D. at 292.
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One final complaint is based on the scope of an attorney's
efforts while engaged in collecting data for actual or possible
litigation."'4 Not only may the zone of silence include legal mat-
ters, but it may also include communications of a non-legal
nature."" Inasmuch as the privilege has been held applicable on-
ly to disclosures of a legal kind, ' the subject matter test can con-
ceal knowledge of a wide span of business events. For the privilege
to apply, the attorney must be "acting as a lawyer" and in his legal
capacity.1" By rendering advice on technical, economic, or
business concerns, the attorney is not "acting as a lawyer."1 '7 As
one court surmised, the application of a narrower standard would
"result in less frequent use of attorneys as corporate sleuths. '
The wide range of communications protected by the privilege
under the subject matter test has also raised fears that, even though
the attorney is acting in a legal capacity, the client may not be
acting as a client. This theory stemmed from dictum in Hickman
v. Taylor,' 9 which precluded from the protection of the privilege
the communications of mere witnesses."s° Subsequent decisions,
most notably City of Philadelphia,1 ' have used that dictum in bar-
ring from the application of the privilege the communications of
employees who gained information fortuitously." 2
The Diversified or Modified Subject Matter Test
Faced with choosing between the two tests, some courts re-
fused to follow either and developed alternative standards. 5 ' Partly
based on the two original approaches, these hybrid tests have not
been followed with any regularity."' This has contributed to the
143. See Comment, supra note 38, at 466.
144. Id.
145. See Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 147 (D. Del. 1977); Burlington
Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 39 (D. Md. 1974).
146. Hercules, Inc. at 147. See also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp.
357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) (attorney must be "acting as a lawyer" in order for the privilege to
attach); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2292 at 554 (the attorney must be working in his legal
capacity).
147. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954).
148. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d at 1237.
149. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
150. See supra note 67.
151. 210 F. Supp. 483 (1963).
152. Id. at 485. Judge Kirkpatrick postulated that an employee who gave information to counsel
without himself being the client was only a witness and was precluded by the Hickman doctrine
from protection by the attorney-client privilege.
153. See Comment, supra note 84, at 1054.
154. Id.
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chaotic situation of uncertainty exising prior to 1981 ."' Despite
the affirmance of the Harper & Row decision by the Supreme
Court, the ruling was dubiously received because there was no
opinion given to explain the significance of the evenly split vote."s6
In the aftermath of the attacks on the subject matter test, the
Eighth Circuit devised a new standard in Diversified Industries,
Inc. v. Meredith.'" Diversified, a defendant in another action,
sought mandamus to prevent the court-ordered disclosure of cer-
tain memoranda prepared by its attorneys. 55 The court, in an en
banc hearing, agreed with Diversified and allowed mandamus to
issue. The court determined that the control group test relied on
by the lower court was inadequate because of its failure to con-
sider the realities of the modern corporate business client."5 9 Rul-
ing that the free flow of information from the client to the attorney
was obstructed, the court stated that a corporate attorney was faced
with choosing between losing valuable information by not inter-
viewing subordinates and giving insufficient advice because of
the lack of valuable information. 60
Judge Heaney endorsed the subject matter test as being the
more reasonable approach because of its subjective elements.11
However, admitting that there were creditable arguments against
that standard, the court suggested a rule which incorporated
modifications hypothesized by Judge Weinstein." 2 The result was
a five-pronged test that could apply potentially to the communica-
tions of any employee.1"3 The court rationalized its "modified
155. The various circuits have followed different approaches in determining who speaks for
a corporation. Three have adopted the control group test. See United States v. Upjohn Co., 600
F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979). rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.),
599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F. 2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968). The subject
matter test has been adopted by one circuit. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423
F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
Another modified the Harper & Row rule. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d
596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). Two other circuits have avoided the issue by resolving the cases
on other grounds. See In re Thompson, 624 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(John Doe), 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979). The others have not yet faced the issue.
156. Doubt has been raised because of the collateral issue of mandamus in Harper & Row.
Because the Harper & Row decision was split evenly, and since six justices participated both in
Upjohn, which was unanimous, and Harper & Row, it appears that there may have been reliance
by some justices in Harper & Row upon their objection to the use of mandamus. See Stem, supra
note 71, at 1144.
157. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
158. Id. at 599.
159. Id. at 608.
160. Id. at 609. See supra note 105.
161. 572 F.2d at 609.
162. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 50, at 503-46.1 to 503-50.
163. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). The five-point test was
stated as follows:
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Harper & Row test" by deeming it capable of safeguarding against
the abuses that critics claimed to have resulted from the pure sub-
ject matter test.""
According to the court, the Diversified test would further the
aims of the attorney-client privilege. By restricting the subject
matter of the disclosures of employees to the duties of the
employees, the rule would reduce the number of potential com-
municants in relation to a particular matter as well as excluding
fortuitous witnesses.16 It would also preclude from the privilege
routine reports routed through the attorney's office, thus shatter-
ing the zone of silence.1
Proponents believe that the Diversified test achieves the
necessary balance between protecting the confidentiality of a
client's communication and the litigant's need of obtaining all, rele-
vant data affecting his case. 67 The Harper & Row test was re-
fined by the requirements that the communication had to be made
in order to secure legal advice and that only those with a "need
to know" were to be privy to the disclosure."' These refinements
reconcile differences between the pure subject matter test, and
the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege."6 The rule also
avoids possible conflicts between the subject matter test and the
Hickman dictum, and it comports with the modem theory of broad
discovery. 7" Although the question of whether the communica-
tion was made to obtain legal advice is a sensitive issue, the ma-
jority settled the problem by applying Dean Wigmore's presump-
tion in favor of the client's assertion of the privilege. 7" By re-
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's communication if
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2)
the employee making the communication did so at the direction of his corporate
superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the corporation could secure
legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is within the scope of
the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated
beyond those persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its
contents.
Id. The court added that the corporation has the burden of meeting all of these criteria in order
to establish a valid claim of privilege.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 92, at 1008.
168. See supra note 132, at 358.
169. According to Dean Wigmore, the privilege, as it exists now, is based on subjective
considerations. "In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the ap-
prehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; hence the law must
prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, §2291, at 545.
170. See supra note 132, at 358.
171. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 610. The court referred to Dean Wigmore's statement
that "a matter committed to a professional legal adviser is prima facie so committed for the sake
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stricting this "prima facie" approach to the circumstances of each
individual case, the court maintained the subjective nature of the
approach. 7" Although this tactic places the burden of rebutting
the presumption on the party seeking disclosure of the data, the
corporation has the burden of proving the satisfaction of the five
criteria of the rule.
173
Although recognized as a possible happy medium between
the Harper & Row and the control group tests,' the Diversified
approach has often been criticized for not having fully defined
the scope of the privilege.17 The rule has been considered as plac-
ing too extreme a burden upon the opposing party because of the
presumption in favor of the claimant of the privilege.' Also, those
opposing the broad application of the attorney-client privilege cite
the potential for abuse inherent in the subject matter test as grounds
for adhering to the control group test. 7 These weaknesses have
in turn pointed out the unpredictability of the test, shown by the
uneven application of the rule in subsequent cases.178
The Ampicillin Standard
The District of Columbia District Court enunciated a new
rule of its own shortly after the Diversified decision. In re Am-
picillin Antitrust Litigation79 involved several antitrust actions in
which the plaintiffs sought production of documents identified by
the defendant in interrogatories. Although a special master had
suggested both the subject matter and control group tests in testing
various documents, the court concluded that both were insuffi-
of the legal advice." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, §2296, at 567. Thus, the court made it possi-
ble for corporations to establish a presumption in favor of the privilege by easing what was the
most important requirement necessary for the privilege to attach. 572 F.2d at 610.
172. 572 F.2d at 610.
173. Id. at 609-610.
174. See supra note 132, at 359; Note, supra note 131, at 197.
175. See Jarvis, Inc., 84 F.R.D. at 291. See also Comment, supra note 38, at 469.
176. See Comment, supra note 38, at 469.
177. See supra note 92, at 1009.
178. Id. at 1009 n.61. Two cases cited herein exemplify the hesitancy of courts to follow
this test. One court refused to consider all five elements. SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 453 F.
Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978). Another court held that the rule did not apply to an employee's com-
munication because he was not an agent of the corporation when he made the communication.
SEC v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1978). But see Union Planters Na-
tional Bank v. ABC Records, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 472 (W.D. Tenn. 1979) (the court followed the
Diversified test).
179. 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
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cient and proclaimed a new rule.180 Judge Richey noted that this
rule was superior to the other approaches because it was based
on the relevance of the communication to a particular legal
problem, 8' whereas the control group test and the subject matter
rule were based upon the identity of the communicant and the
nature of the communication, respectively." The Ampicillin rule
strikes a middle ground between the two.' s The court held that
the control group test artificially restricted the availability of the
privilege to only a few of those offering information to the at-
torney, frustrating the policy of frank interchange between the
client and the attorney.1' By requiring the communications to be
relevant to a particular legal difficulty, the Ampicillin test
eliminates the need to examine the communicant's job status and
the effects of orders from the upper echelon of management.'
This more pragmatic rule allows employees with personal
knowledge of important facts to disclose that data without having
to have orders from supervisors; it also curbs the privileging of
communications of those with only a slight awareness of the
facts."8 6 Perhaps the only valid criticism is that it is applicable
only upon a case-by-case basis, thus endangering its uniformity,
but this is the most valuable aspect of the rule. By having subjec-
tive values, it is applicable to more diverse situations, while its
other provisions protect against abuse. 8" This standard probably
is closer to what the privilege seeks to achieve than any other test
enunciated before it. "
180. Id. at 385. The court required that the following criteria be met:
(1) The particular employee or representative of the corporation must have made
a communication of information which was reasonably believed to be necessary
to the decision-making process concerning a problem on which legal advice was
sought; (2) The communication must have been made for the purpose of securing
legal advice; (3) The subject matter of the communication to or from an employee
must have been related to the performance by the employee of the duties of his
employment; and (4) The communication must have been a confidential
one .... (emphasis by the court).
Id.
181. Id. The court explained that, by "relevance of the communication to a particular legal
problem," it meant that the communication had to foster a reasonable belief that the information
was necessary in making a decision. The court then added that its rule would curb the scope of
the privilege more than the broad Harper & Row rule and would deal with the relevancy of the
disclosure of the employee to the problem at hand. Id. at n. 10.
182. Id. at n. 10. See also Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: The Subject Mat-
ter Test v. The Control Group Test: Will Reasonableness Prevail? 5 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 480, 490
(1980) (neither the control group test nor the subject matter rule considers the relevance of the
communication to the legal problem).
183. 81 F.R.D. at 386.
184. Id. at 387.
185. See Comment, supra note 38, at 469-70.
186. 1d.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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THE SUPREME COURT DECISION: Upjohn Co. v. United States
A unanimous decision by the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co.
v. United States189 supposedly laid the control group standard to
a well-deserved rest. In reversing the Sixth Circuit,19 ° the Court
reiterated the purposes and policies underlying the attorney-client
privilege. According to the Court, the privilege, designed to en-
courage frank consultation between clients and attorneys while
protecting the interests of justice, "recognizes that sound legal ad-
vice or advocacy serves public ends and ...depends upon the
lawyer [sic] being fully informed by the client."' Justice Rehn-
quist noted that the control group test ran counter to the basic
rationale behind the privilege by discouraging the free communica-
tion of data from corporate employees to lawyers providing legal
advice to the client.' 2 Rationalizing its opinion, the Court observed
that the control group test violated the privilege by neglecting to
guard both the giving of legal advice to those who can act on it
and the tendering of relevant facts to the attorney to facilitate the
formulation of sound and adequate advice. "
The majority reasoned that the communications of Upjohn's
employees' to the general counsel were made at the direction
of the chairman for the purpose of obtaining legal advice based
189. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
190. The lower courts held that the work product doctrine was inapplicable to administrative
summonses issued under I.R.C. §7602(b), and that the IRS had only "to show that the inquiry
[was] relevant to a good faith investigation conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the
information sought [was] not in the IRS' possession and that proper administrative procedures
[had] been followed." United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1228 n. 13 (6th Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). In reviewing the history of the doctrine, the Supreme Court held
that the lower tribunals had used an improper standard. 449 U.S. at 401. The test employed by
the lower courts, based on "substantial need and undue hardship," was inapplicable in this case.
Id. Memoranda and mental impressions, based on oral communications made to an attorney, have
been held to be beyond the purview of the "substantial need and undue hardship" test. Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947). These materials, labelled opinion work product, have been
deemed as being absolutely protected from discovery by some courts. See In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis),
412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Although the Court did not go so far as to uphold the
absolute status given the opinion work product in those and other cases, 449 U.S. at 401, it did
hold that "a far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability ... than was made ... in this
case would be necessary to compel disclosure." Id. at 402. This holding may, in effect, overturn
decisions treating opinion work product as less than absolutely protected, See In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979). The Court remanded the issue to
the lower court for further proceedings, requiring a greater showing of need and hardship. 449
U.S. at 402.
191. 449 U.S. at 389.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 390.
194. Seven of the eighty-six employees interviewed by Upjohn's counsel were not employed
at the time of the interview. Neither the district court nor the circuit court addressed the claim
made by Upjohn that the attorney-client privilege applied to communications made by former
employees while still employed. Because of the lack of treatment by the lower courts, the Supreme
Court refused to entertain the matter. Id. at 394 n.3.
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on information gleaned from the performance of the employees'
duties. 9 ' The opinion implied that the subordinates were aware
that the content of their communications was to be kept confidential
and was to be used for the preparation of legal services. 9" This
was held to be consistent with the policy of the privilege, and
the Court ruled that the restriction of information channels was
an irrational infringement on the client's right to prevent the
unauthorized disclosure of its statements.""
The Court justified its rejection of the control group test after
reflecting on several of the faults that it detected within the rule.
Noting that the control group test forced counsel to choose be-
tween accepting unprivileged data and giving deficient legal opin-
ions, the Court added that the control group test ignored the
primary reason for the existence of the privilege, that of pro-
tecting disclosures made to aid the attorney in giving legal
advice.9 8 Justice Rehnquist mused that an attorney must assimilate
all relevant data in order to determine what actually happened and
to devise a course of action.' As the Court opined, often these
facts are not in the possession of control group members, but of
lower level employees. These people are often capable of caus-
ing legal difficulties for the corporation, and it is natural that they
know of pertinent facts connected to those problems. Additional-
ly, the Court said that these employees are the individuals who
will utilize the end-products of the lawyer's efforts.2"' As Justice
Rehnquist assessed the situation, the control group test dissuades
employees from conveying germane details to attorneys seeking
202to advise clients.
In addition to these comments, the opinion discussed the
detrimental effects of the restrictive control group standard upon
the attempts by corporate attorneys who encourage compliance
195. Id. at 394.
196. Id. at 395. Justice Rehnquist opined that "even those interviewees not receiving a ques-
tionnaire were aware of the legal implications" of the communications, which were indeed con-
sidered to be "highly confidential." Id.
19 /. Id.
198. Id. at 390.
199. Id. at 390-91.
200. Id. The majority added that lower level employees could "embroil the corporation in
serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the relevant in-
formation needed" for the developing of adequate advice for the client on such matters. Id. at
391. See also Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 608-09.
201. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392. See Duplan Corp., 397 F. Supp. at 1164 (lawyer's opinion
"is of no immediate benefit to the chairman of the board or the president").
202. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392. But see In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d
at 1236 (without regard to the privilege, the lower level employees are not protected from disclosure;
even if it applied, the control group could waive the privilege as it applied to each employee).
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with complex regulations and who investigate internal
malfeasance.23 The value of these actions by corporate counsel
are depreciated by the unnatural limitations placed on the applica-
tion of the privilege by the control group test.
The Court found that the test adopted by the Sixth Circuit
denied the corporate attorney the opportunity to gather all of the
existing facts concerning a particular controversy. As the Court
viewed the situation, the lawyer was subject to further disillu-
sionment in attempting to determine the representatives of a cor-
poration; not only would the attorney have to risk the receipt of
unprivileged information, but he also would have to gamble that
the actual communications would fit the differing control group
definitions which varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.2" The
application of the control group test, according to the Court,
resulted in conflicting conclusions in different courts, thus -render-
ing it incapable of providing the predictability required to give
the privilege meaning."' The majority opinion declared that an
uncertain privilege, or privilege susceptible to indefinite applica-
tion, was little better than no privilege at all. "
The Court of Appeals' disparaging comments about the sub-
ject matter test were considered inconsequential. The Court
dismissed the Sixth Circuit's assertion that the broad standard
would obstruct the rules of discovery; it espoused the proposi-
tion that the privilege extended only to communications, and not
to the facts underlying the communications to the attorneys. "' The
party seeking production in the instant case, declared the Court,
could interview the employees and examine the facts and
documents which precipitated the controversy; the same data could
be found by that party without attempting to use discovery." The
Court held that convenience in searching for evidence was an in-
sufficient cause to overcome the long-established purposes of the
privilege.29
203. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394. See Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 609.
204. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393. See supra note 114.
205. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393. See supra note 155.
206. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
207. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96 (quoting City of Philadelphia, 205 F. Supp. at 831). See
Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 611. Litigants may still examine business documents, depose cor-
porate employees, and interview nonemployees, [and] obtain pre-existing documents and finan-
cial records not prepared . . . for the purpose of communications with the law firm in confidence."
572 F.2d at 611. See also In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 389 (D.D.C.
1978); 97 C. J. S. Witnesses § 276 at 785 (1957).
208. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96. See Note, supra note 155; Note, supra note 207.
209. Note, supra note 155, at 396.
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The discussion of the privilege issue was concluded by the
Court's pronouncement of an ad hoc approach in applying the
attorney-client privilege. In adopting such a rule, the majority
refused to be bound by either one test or the other. The Court
claimed that the Federal Rules of Evidence required an ad hoc
basis. " ° The Court felt that a broader, subjective approach would
prevent some of the inherent inequities of the objective test without
vitiating the privilege. The Court then reversed the Sixth Circuit,
holding that the communications by the employees to the general
counsel were privileged, in so far as the comments were made
while seeking legal services."'
Chief Jiustice Burger, in a concurring opinion, agreed with
the majority's decision pertaining to the attorney-client privilege,21
but he alleged that the Court had shirked its duty in not providing
attorneys and lower courts with guidance for similar situations.
He would have implemented, at least, a minimum standard for
governing similar situations in the future. 3
Analysis of the Possible Implications of
Upjohn Co. v. United States
A definitive ruling on the question of determining who speaks
for a corporation was long overdue, as evidenced by the diffusive
conclusions reached by the various federal courts. Many writers,
desiring uniformity in applying the privilege, had promoted one
test or another. 1 ' The hopes of many had been raised in the ex-
pectation that the Upjohn decision would settle the conflict by pro-
mulgating a standard which would be of general application in
future controversies.1 5
The Upjohn ruling, while decreasing the discretion of judges
by reducing the number of options available to courts regarding
the attorney-client privilege, provided limited guidance to courts
210. Id. Rule 501 states that "the privileges of a witness [or] person . . . shall be governed
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501.
211. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402.
212. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
213. Id. at 402-03. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
214. See, e.g., Note, The Sixth Circuit Adopts the Control Group Test, 9 CAP. U. L. REV.
809, 826 (1980) (supported the Diversified rule); Note, supra note 132, at 496-97 (supporting
broader subject matter tests); Brown, supra note 131, at 196-97 (supports the Diversified rule);
Note, supra 82, at 434-35 (adheres to control group test); Note, supra note 132, at 359 (supports
the Diversified rule); Note, supra note 92, at 1015 (prefers the control group test).
215. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 38 at 479; Comment, supra note 84, at 1054; Death
Knell, supra note 72, at 1102-03.
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in construing the privilege. The case also realized that a broader
standard could better protect the underlying principles of the
privilege while recognizing complicated aspects of modern
corporations.21 Corporate attorneys are now practically guaranteed
freedom from involuntary disclosure of communications from
lower-level employees. Legal services may now be rendered
without the tainting effects of forced disclosure impairing the ap-
plication of the privilege.
Although signalling the advent of broader applications of the
attorney-client privilege to communications of corporate clients,
the decision left several issues, including some new questions,
unresolved. Unpredictability may result from the Court's failure
to establish a standard rule. Notwithstanding the potential for
uncertainty, the Court may have taken the correct approach in
not drafting a concrete test. Prior decisions had reached the con-
clusion that the many diverse probabilities rendered almost im-
possible the development of an established dogma, and that the
ad hoc method was the only practical manner to treat the
problem.217 The Court stated that it would not announce a stan-
dard, "even were [it] able to do so." '218 Complexities in modern
business have created innumerable situations involving the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. Many different
rules have come about in litigation concerning only a few of the
instances. The inability to foresee potential difficulties has made
the prior rules inadequate to serve in each individual matter without
some modification of the existing standards. Justice Rehnquist's
refusal to anticipate the vicissitudes in corporate business may
have been the wisest approach possible. The interpretations of
this decision by jurists and legal theoreticians will have to deter-
mine the actual implications of this case and to settle the various
issues arising from the criteria of the Court.
The Upjohn decision, however, has raised almost as many
issues as it has settled. The lack of precision by the majority could
lend to the dilution of this decision by its being distinguished on
its facts from the many permutations available in the corporate
setting. The opinion cited the Federal Rules of Evidence as re-
216. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1981).
217. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (the privilege should be
determined on a case-by-case basis); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n., 320 F.2d
314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963) ("These matters will all have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
No one is wise enough to decide them in advance."); Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp.
792, 794 (D. Del. 1954) (there is no blanket privilege; each document must be considered
separately).
218. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
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quiring an ad hoc approach toward the attorney-client privilege,
based on the separate circumstances of each individual situation." 9
According to Chief Justice Burger, however, the rules require
the Court to provide guidance to the lower courts, which dictates
that a more uniform mode of application should be established
for the privilege. " Under the majority's interpretation of Rule
501, each judge facing a privilege question could formulate a dif-
ferent rule.
Inasmuch as the federal rules call for courts to apply the prin-
ciples of the common law privilege, as experience would dictate,
trial judges would be able to choose from a range extending from
the broad rules of Harper & Row, Diversified, and Ampicillin to
the practically unlimited applications of the privilege used in deci-
sions before 1962, such as Zenith and United Shoe. Such a wide
diversity of methods would result in a chaotic state of affairs. No
reasonable person would be able, with any precision, to predict
which communications would be privileged. Forum shopping
would result from the searching by plaintiffs for jurisdictions with
more liberal discovery policies and stricter applications of the
attorney-client privilege. Appellate courts would be flooded by
parties who had thought that communications made to their at-
torneys were confidential and privileged. Chief Justice Burger's
interpretation of the federal rules offers a more consistent applica-
tion of the privilege. With at least some rudimentary principles
as guidelines, future decisions might achieve harmonious results,
even without an absolute standard to follow.
The concurring opinion alluded to various factors relied upon
by the majority in finding the attorney-client privilege applicable
to the instant situation. " These factors, according to Justice Rehn-
quist, were present in this instance, consonant with the principles
of the privilege, and dispositive of the matter." The Court did
not indicate that the factors should constitute a new set of rules
governing the use of the privilege; indeed, the opinion explicitly
stated that there would be no series of criteria issuing forth from
219. Id. at 396-97.
220. Id. at 403-04.
221. Id. at 402.
222. Id. at 394-95. In justifying the application of the privilege, the majority relied on several
factors. In the instant case, the communications involved information that was unavailable from
the hierarchy and was concerned with subjects within the scope of employment of the employees
of the company. The employees communicated the information to the company's counsel on orders
from superiors. They were informed that the disclosures were for the purpose of securing legal
advice and would be considered confidential, as indeed they were. The majority held that the
company and employees met these factors, which were consistent with the policies of the attorney-
client privilege.
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the decision.223 Those who rely on this case in future controver-
sies, even with these factors as guides, may remain uncertain as
to which employees speak for the corporation, and which do not.
The factors do not consider the extension of the privilege to com-
munications made by an employee at his own initiative. They also
do not specify the superiors to which an employee would be
responsible for making the disclosure. The Court also noted that
the employees in the instant matter were aware that the attorneys'
interviews were part of the process of preparing legal advice for
Upjohn's internal examination. The opinion, limited to its facts
by the Court itself, did not address possible communications of
lower-level employees who provide attorneys with facts pertinent
to the giving of legal services in the course of normal litigation.22
In devising these factors, the Court apparently adopted the
criteria of the Diversified rule.22 Although stating that it decided
only "concrete cases and not abstract propositions,"2 6 one of the
conclusions inferable from the indefinite ruling is that the Court
impliedly approved the Diversified rule." 7 By doing so, the Court
may have reasoned that the Diversified requisites were better suited
for the facts at hand; it might have adopted another test had the
circumstances dictated the need for a different test. Additionally,
the Court may have tacitly approved the Diversified modifications
of the Harper & Row ruling by modeling its factors after the Diver-
sified test. The revised subject matter approach may therefore be
the preferable standard in applying the attorney-client privilege
to corporations in the future.
The possible acceptance of the modified subject matter test
raises an interesting question concerning impending use of the
subject matter rules. Prior to Upjohn, the Supreme Court had
passed on only the Harper & Row rule, the broadest of the modem
approaches. The decision in Harper & Row was reached by an
equally-split vote, and no opinion was given. Because six members
of the present Court participated in both decisions, some doubt
has been cast upon the justification of the dissenting votes. 8 The
lack of a clear-cut endorsement in Harper & Row denied a much-
223. Id. at 386, 396.
224. See Feld, Supreme Court in Upjohn Protects Attorney-Client Privilege; Upholds the
Work-Product Doctrine, 54 J. TAX 210, 212-13 (1981).
225. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th cir. 1978) (en banc). See
supra note 163.
226. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
227. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 609.
228. There was some controversy over the use of mandamus as a means of protecting the
attorney-client privilege. Did the change in votes result from a shift in thinking by several justices
or the absence of the mandamus issue? See also supra note 156.
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needed affirmance to the subject matter standard. The change in
votes may signify that the Court would accept much broader in-
terpretations of the privilege by future courts.29
In upholding Upjohn's claim of privilege, the Court appeared
to have incorporated tenets of the Diversified test into the factors
it listed as being dispositive of the case. The opinion placed em-
phasis upon the nature of the communication, and not upon the
identity of the communicant. The majority failed, however, to
address the relevance of the disclosure to the legal problem. This
is a regrettable omission. As found in Ampicillin, the considera-
tion of a communication's relevance to the controversy at hand
results in a logical balance between protecting liberal discovery
policies and guarding the purposes of the attorney-client
privilege."' The Ampicillin rule would close gaps left by the
Court's inadequate resolution of this case, and it would comport
with the decision's ad hoc application of the privilege.231 Even
though the Court apparently adapted the Diversified rule to fit the
facts, the majority should have given the Ampicillin rule at least
a cursory examination.
Justice Rehnquist definitely rejected the control group test,
but did not expressly condemn all objective standards. Despite
holding the control group standard as being violative of the prin-
ciples of the privilege, the majority did not disapprove of all ob-
jective measurements. The opinion considered the test adopted
by the Sixth Circuit, and the decision was restricted to the instant
facts. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the Court rejected tests
utilizing a measure of objectivity. Because of the limited ap-
plicability of this decision, it may be premature to declare the con-
trol group test dead, as was done after the Court's affirmance of
the Harper & Row rule."' Subsequent decisions "resurrected" the
control group test, and it eventually gained superiority over all
other standards. 2
229. There has been speculation that the Harper & Row test would have been approved over-
whelmingly, had there been no mandamus issue. See Stern, supra note 156 at 1144.
230. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 387 (D.D.C. 1978).
231. Id. at 385. The Ampicillin decision requires a case-by-case examination of the disclosure
and of the context in which it was made. The test protects communications by employees acting
on their own initiative, if the communications were made with a reasonable belief that the infor-
mation was necessary in making a decision concerning a legal problem. No consideration has
to be given to whether the disclosure was made at the behest of superiors, thus relieving the at-
torney of the burden of choosing which superiors may order privileged communications and which
cannot. Id. at 385-87.
232. See supra note 92 at 1009.
233. A majority of federal courts abide by the control group test, even after its "death" in
1971. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397,
400 (E.D. Va. 1975).
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The uncertainty of Upjohn may well cause needless future
litigation. Chief Justice Burger stated that the unnecessary un-
predictability inherent in the majority opinion would promulgate
"continuing uncertainty and confusion."" ' He contended that the
Court should at least enunciate a minimum standard and that the
Court had incurred a special duty under the federal rules "to clarify
aspects of the law of privileges" for the guidance of the lower
courts.23 This standard could provide direction for attorneys who
are uncertain in gathering information from corporate subordinates
because of the indefinite boundaries of the privilege. At least a
minimal rule could allay some of these fears.
Conclusion
Upjohn raises almost as many questions as it settles. However,
its importance to attorneys with corporate clients cannot be over-
emphasized. By recognizing the state of modern business, the
Court has rejected the control group test, upon which the Sixth
Circuit and the majority of federal courts relied, as being an un-
necessary burden upon the policies of the attorney-client privilege.
The Court expressly resounds the historical precedents for main-
taining the privilege, holding that the interests of justice in pro-
tecting the free and confidential flow of information between at-
torneys and clients are greater than the aims sought by the con-
trol group test and the liberal rules of discovery.
Despite this, the questions which have arisen from the in-
definite results of the Upjohn decision may prove to be a fresh
source of litigation and controversy. Although the Court had good
cause in refusing to espouse a new hypothesis, the ensuing uncer-
tainty becomes troublesome. Since the majority of jurisdictions
favored the control group test, the resultant gap must be filled.
Without some guidelines, the courts may invent new rules or apply
already existing theories. It may lead to more equitable decisions,
based on each individual situation and dealing with the peculiar
nuances of the cases. However, no continuity will be available
as a basis of predicting the outcome of future difficulties, thus
234. Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383, 402 (1981) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
235. Id. at 403-04. The Chief Justice stated in his minimum rule that the "attorney must be
one authorized by the management to inquire into the subject." He added that the lawyer should
be seeking information to aid in the performance of any of the following: "(a) evaluating whether
the employee's conduct has bound or would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal conse-
quences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to actions that
have been or may be taken by others with regard to that conduct." Chief Justice Burger stated
that the court had a duty to clarify matters which were ambiguous or conflicting, and that a minimum
rule was the least the court could do. Id.
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placing an additional burden on counsel's ability to give sound
legal advice.
The concurring opinion had the proper idea in mind when
it devised a minimum standard for guiding courts, clients, and
counselors in the application of the privilege. Although the ma-
jority's ruling will have far-reaching effects in the corporate con-
text of legal relations, necessity dictates that some direction must
be given in order for clients to claim the privilege. Chief Justice
Burger properly interpreted Rule 501 as requiring the Court to
establish a rule. The shining expectations of Upjohn have been
tarnished by the ambivalence of the Court toward promulgating
a respectable standard capable of at least slight uniformity. It will
remain for future decisions to devise such principles. Although
headed in the right direction, this ruling lacks certain aspects which
prevent it from being an adequate standard.
The majority and concurring opinions provide a foundation
for the development of a sufficient test. If courts in the future
would assimilate characteristics attributed to the Ampicillin rule,
this would resolve questions concerning the possession of
knowledge by certain parties, and relating to the orders and aims
of corporate superiors. By adding these requisites to the factors
enunciated by the majority, upcoming decisions could result in
the emergence of a satisfactory standard. With refinements, such
a rule would create an equitable equilibrium between the rules
of discovery and the ends sought by the privilege. Under this
hybrid test, disclosures could be privileged if the communication
is relevant to the legal problem, related to the performance of
the employee's duties, made to secure legal aid, and intended to
be confidential. Such a rule would restore confidence to corporate
attorneys, end abuses of the privilege, and instill greater vitality
to a time-proven right of law.
Marvin E. Wiggins, Jr.
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